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'Examining the Evidence Concerning the Relationship 
of the Rate of Growth to the Level of Development' 
by Charles L. Wright* 
Development literature contains the hypotheses that countries 
pass through successive stages of slow· growth. accelerating 
growth and finally decelerating growth, and that middle 
income countries grow faster than other cormtries, Hagen 
and Hawrylyshyn in 1969 found the hypotheses unsupported by 
empirical evidence, while Horvat in 1974 •confirmed• the 
hypotheses and concluded that income disparities among coun~ 
tries aredecreasing. This pa.per examines the debate in ligh.t 
of data for the 196o decade, and with regard to the nature of 
the hypotheses themselves, findingHorvat's position unsuppor-
ted by the evidence. 
INTRODUCTION 
The literature on the disputed relationship between the rate of 
growth and the level of development has been concisely reviewed by 
Horvat Ll9741 382-JJ. There are three questions involved, namely 
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the existence, nature and cause of such a relationship. Horvat 
states that prior to his article scholars refuting the existence of 
such a relationship seemed to have more impressive evidence. Hagen and 
Hawrylyshyn in particular found no support for the hypothesis of fastest 
growth in middle income countries, while the alleged relationship of 
income growth to per capita income wa.s weak or non-existent 
£:19691 49; 88-9J. Horvat contests these findings with data from the 
overlapping subperiods 1953-1963 and 19.58-1968. Using regression 
analysis, he claims to confirm the hypotheses at the o.i% level 
LPP• 382-94J. Horvat then concludes that there exists a ., 
"self-correcting mechanism of the world economic development pro-
cess ••• except for those in the initial phase of development, all 
other countries are catching up with the most advanced pioneers" 
LP· 392J. 
The present research attempts to resolve the apparent empirical 
contradictions in these studies and investigates the logical difficul-
ties inherent in such analyses. 
THE HYPOTHESES 
Initially, it is necessary to point out that there are two distinct 
hypotheses involved: (1) fastest income growth will be found in middle-income 
countries (hereafter, the "cross-sectional hypothesis"); and (2) countries 
pass through three successive stages of growth: slow, accelerating and 
decelerating (hereafter, the "historical hypothesis"). They are super-
ficially similar and Horvat makes no distinction between them. However, 
the first hypothesis refers to international comparisons for specific 
time periods and may be tested with cross-sectional data for any 
given time period(s). The conclusions would apply only for the 
J 
period or periods examined. The second hypothesis refers to a secular 
historical process for given countries over time and cannot be tested 
with cross-sectional data.1 The only data which may be used to test 
this hypothesis are the historical growth rates and income figures for 
currently developed countries, Since statistical tests cannot be 
applied to the individual experiences, and the results could not in 
any case be extrapolated for other countries, noiattempt is made in 
the present research to test the historical hypothesis. 2 
The cross-sectional hypothesis, on the other hand, may be readily 
tested with available data and is the subject of the following analysis. 
DATA 
The selection and treatment of observations in the present 
research is similar to that used by Horvat, with exceptions for dif-
ferences in exclusion of observations and in methodology which will be 
mentioned as they occur. The data comes from the same source, the 
U.N. Statistical Yearbook, in my case the 1974 edition LPP· 6)4-42; 
650-2J. The 51 countries in my sample were listed in some part of 
Horvat's study and met his a priori criteria of data for a reasonably 
long growth period and 11 critical mass" of 1 million population and 
half a billion dollars of income. The period considered is the 
1960 decade ora subset of years within the same decade. 3 A few 
countries are eliminated due to lack of data on relevant variables. 
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These include the Eastern European countries with centrally planned 
economies, since they do not calculate GDP per capita and their exchange 
rates for conversion to U.S. dollars are even more arbitrary than for 
market economies. 
TESTING 'IHE ALLEGED RELATIONSHIPS 
There are several methods which might be used for statistical 
tests of the cross-sectional hypothesis. Horvat states, "It is 
assumed that the relationship exists between the growth of total (not 
per capita) GDP and the logarithm of per capita GDP"LP• 385J. Horvat 
thus defines the dependent variable as: 
g = percentage rate of growth of GDP per annum, 
rather than : 
g' = percentage rate of growth of per capita GDP per annum. 
The independent variable is to be expressed as a logarithm of 
Y = GDP per capita (in U .s. dollars) • 
Horvat reasons that a faster rate of growth among the middle income 
countries may be tested by dividing the observations into "low" and 
"high" income groups and examining regression estimates for evidence 
of an upward-sloping curve for the low income group and a downward-sloping 
curve for the high income group, such as the curves in Figure 1 (a) and 
(b). 
There are several drawbacks to Horvat's procedure. It is unclear 
why the dependent variable should be expressed as g (growth of GDP) 
rather than g' (growth of per capita GDP). It is equally unclear why 
' 
such a social phenomenon as cross-sectional growth rates should best 
be described as a logarithmic function. In both cases, examination 
and comparison would seem preferable to assumption. Finally, the 
division into high and low income groups is arbitrary, and Horvat 
makes the division by ti inspection" of the data, using different 
dividing points for the two groups for the subperiods he considers 
LP· JB6J. 
I have chosen to eliminate arbitrary and subjective division 
of the sample observations by choosing what seems to be the simplest 
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and least arbitrary method of representing the hypothesized relationship: 
a parabolic-type function such as that shown in Figure 1 ( c) • Tw·o 
mathematical expressions are used: 
(1) g = a + bY + cY2 
(2) g = a + b(log Y) + c(log Y)2 
The symbols g and Y are defined as before, and in each equation 
it is necessary to test if the coefficient Pb" is statistically 
significantly greater than zero and if "c " is less than zero at 
(say) the 5% level of significance. The first equation is probably 
the most straightforward manner of representing a parabola and is 
used as an alternative to Horvat's assumption of a logarithmic 
relationship as expressed in equation (2). The dependent variable 
g may similarly be replaced in the above equations by g' as an al-
ternative to assuming that the relationship is between income and total 
growth rather than per capita growth. The results of the least-squares 
regressions are given by equations (3) - (6), with "t" values in 
parentheses. 
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(3) g = 5,3 - O.OOOlY - 0,00000002y2 -2 R = - 0.032 
(11.87) (0.14) (0.08) 
(4) g = -5,7 + 8.32logY - l,55(logY)2 -2 R = - 0.001 
( 0. 68) ( 1. 33) (1.36) 
(5) g' = 2.0 + 0.00251 - o.0000007y2 
(4.59) (3.13) (2.57) 
(6) g' = -12.0 + 9.74logY - l.49(logY)2 if2 = 0.166 
(1.43) (1. 57) (1.32) 
Equations (3) and (4) may be regarded as tests that a relationship 
exists between the rate of growth of GDP and level of GDP per capita, 
as stated by Horvat, The ad.justed coefficients of determination are 
negative and the "t" tests are non-significant at the 5% level. 
Thus there is no evidence in support of Horvat' s arguments, 
Equations (5) and (6) show that if any relationship exists at 
all in the cross-sectional observations, it is between GDP per capita 
and the per capita rate of growth. The quadratic function (5) rather 
than the logarithmic relationship asswned by Horvat is the only one 
with ''t" values significant at the 5% level. Moreover, the tests 
in equation (5) cannot be accepted without question as definitive 
proof of the relationship. The "explanatory' power" of this regression 
is very low, while the correlation between independent variables is 
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very high: 0.948 for Y a.nd 1- (for log Y a.nd its square, the simple 
correlation is almost unity: .o. 997). This high correlation ca.n bias 
the regression coefficients (the numerators of the "t" tests) in 
opposite directions when combined with low expla.na.tory power, pos-
sible specification problems a.nd the inevitable errors in macro-
economic data ["Johnston, 1972: 16o-9J. 
In summary, a very weak relationship may exist between the per 
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capita measures of growth a.nd income. The relationship between total 
growth a.nd per capita income assumed by Horvat is completely unsupported. 
by the data, as is the assumption rega.rding the logarithmic specification. 
The question naturally a.rises as to the differences between my results 
(confirming Hagen a.nd Hawrylshyn 's findings) and those of Horvat. 
Actually, the contrast occurs only because of Horvat's post hoc elimi-
nation of tw·o groups of observations. The first group is dismissed for 
"political .instability" or "too great a burden of traditions" and includes: 
Morroco, Uruguay, Argentina, United Kingdom, Ireland, Chile, Bolivia a.nd 
Ghana. Horvat presents no justification for considering political 
instability as the cause of low growth rates rather than vice-versa, 
( economic. difficulties in Uruguay, for example, clearly preceeded its 
political collapse into military rule). There is also no explanation as 
to why some traditional or politically unstable countries manage to 
obtain respectable growth rates, or how the United Kingdom ca.n be 
classified with Morroco a.nd Bolivia under a.ny reasonable definition of 
"traditional" or ''politically unstable". 
' 
Horvat's elimination of a second group of countries is equally 
unacceptable with the exception of Iran and Saudia Arabia (due to 
excessive oil rents). The remaining countries in the group a.re: 
Thailand, UAR, Taiwan, Zambia, Syria and South Korea. 
The only common trait among the countries in either group is 
that they a.re off Horvat's assumed regression lines (the first group 
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considerably below, the second group above). The~~----------- ---- -
~ 
naturally resulted in "sigllI:tTcari.t 11~regre~on coefficients and 
2 
somewhat higher R values. When Horvat used all the observations 
not eliminated by the a priori criteria (minimum growth period and 
critical mass), his results a.re consistent with mine: an R2 of about 
0.2 for the low income group and non-significant regression coeffi-
cients for the high income group [""Horvat, 1974: 391J. 
A NOTE ON CAUSALITY 
Questions of causality may seem superfluous when dealing with 
weak or non-existent relationships. Some developed countries, 
however, may prove to have secular growth patterns similar to that 
suggested by the historical hypothesis (which has not been tested 
here). There may also be some researchers who will regard my 
equation (5) as evidence supporting a modified cross-sectional hypothesis. 
In each case, explanations a.re required. This points out a crucial 
logical difficulty with the literature on the subject: the hypotheses 
do not discriminate among alternative causal factors. 
Horvat lists the following reasons for accelerating growth among 
low income countries (presumably applicable to either the historical 
' 
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or cross-sectional case) f:p. Jel+.:Ja (1) a declining capital-output 
ratio; (2) combined factor productivity; (3) shifts to manufacturing, and 
(4) ease of borrowing technology from more advanced countries. 
Decelerating growth among high income countries is conversely attri-
buted to a declining share of manufacturing in total output and to 
reduced possibilities of assimulating new technology from more developed 
countries, 
I suggest that these reasons are neither convincing nor exhaus-
tive. For example, it may be that developed countries have greater 
ease of producing, borrowing and assimilating new technology than other 
countries, since they possess the complements of trained manpower, 
sophisticated equipment and high levels of existing technology. 
There is, furthermore, at least one interesting alternative to Horvat's 
declining capital-output ratio and shift to manufacturing as an explana-
tion for an intermediate stage of high growth, should it occur. This 
involves the distinction between stock and flow resources~Georgescu-Roegen, 
1975,, pp, 347-BlJ • Stock resources are non-renewable. The neoclassical 
concepts of capital accumulation and replacement may also be viewed as 
depletion of non-renewable.resources. As a country learns to extract 
and process mineral and other stock resources, it may experience a 
spurt of growth. Yet eventually these resources become depleted and 
substitutes are more difficult to find and require greater investment 
of time and materials to make usabie. Growth thus decelerates. Decelera-
tion may also occur if the country adopts goals and policies which con-
flict with short-term growth, such as clean air and conservation. 
' 
The above factors a.re of course merely suggestive of additional 
explanations for a long-term accelerating-decelerating pattern of 
growth, should it be found in particular cases. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The relationship between the rate of growth and GDP per capita is 
weak or non-existent for cross-sectional data in the 1960 decade, 
whether growth rates a.re expressed in total or per capita terms. 
There is thus no evidence to suggest improvement in relative income 
disparities among countries. 
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Figure l, Alternative representations of hypothesized relation-
ship of growth rate and income level. 
' 
NOTES 
1 At a minimum, one would have to assume that modern LDC's will follow 
the same growth path as currently developed countries experienced. '!his 
assumption is untenable, as pointed out by Higgins in his critique of 
the "stage theories" of development ["1968., PP'• 174-29'±J • 
2 
'!here are reasons for doubting this hypothesis at the outset, how-
ever. The economic history of the United States, for example, is marked 
by booms, depressions and phases of differing growth rates of varying 
lengths. Its unimpressive recent performance cannot be taken as evi-
dence of a well-delineated phase of deceleration supporting the hypothesis. 
Similarly, countries such as Italy and the United Kingdom have been 
criticized for their post-war economic performance. One might find, 
nevertheless, that their growth during the period (e.g., 5,3 and 2.8% 
total growth per annum during the 1960 decade) are quite respectable 
when compared with other periods in their histories. 
J The following countries comprise the sample (growth rate data 
are for the 1960-1970 period unless otherwise listed): Australia, 
Japan (1961-70), South Africa, Switzerland (1960-1969), Israel, Egypt, 
Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, South Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, 
Norway, Pakistan (1960-1969), Paraguay, Peru, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Burma (1962-1970), Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark 
(1961-1970), Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, France, West 
Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Philippines, Portugal, 
" 
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NOTES (2) 
Puerto Rico, Spain, Sri Lanka (1963-1970), Sweeden, Thailand, Tunisia, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, Tanzania (1964-1970), United States, Venezuela, 
Ghana, and Uruguay. 
In separate regressions, data for nine ad.di tional countries were 
included which did not meet the a priori criteria or for which some of 
the necessary data had to be estimated or extrapolated. Similarly, 
observations using GDP per capita estimates from other sources for 
seven centrally planned economies were combined with the original 51 
observations and with the 60 observations on all market economies. 
In no case did the results differ substantially from those.presented 
in equations (3) - (6) below. 
4 The point of division may be very important, since the addition or 
deletion of a few observations may considerably affect the regression 
estimates when the "explanatory power" of the regression is very low. 
5 The parentheses are Horvat's. 
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